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BOOK REVIEW
GEORGE J. ANNAS, SOME CHOICE: LAW,
MEDICINE, AND THE MARKET.
NEW YORK AND OXFORD: OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1998.
Bernard M Dickens*
George Annas is America's preeminent medico-legal analyst and
commentator whose penetrating vision places contemporary health care
incidents within evolutionary frameworks. His latest book, Some
Choice,' the fourteenth in a sequence of books written, co-authored, or
co-edited by him, will maintain and probably enhance his status as the
benchmark commentator. No topic of medico-legal interest is considered
of actual or potential significance until it achieves his attention. The title
Some Choice points to the gravity and profundity of decisions made in
clinical and public health care. But more often the work is a pithy reac-
tion to the dilemma confronting decision makers who have no real
choice at all, except to select between options that are either bad or
worse, or to succumb to the frustration felt by those most affected by
decisions, the exact ones who have no power to influence them.
The book possesses the many strengths, and the few weaknesses of its
origins in articles that George Annas has previously published, primarily
in the New England Journal of Medicine. For those both unfamiliar and
familiar with the regular "Legal Issues in Medicine" featured in the New
England Journal of Medicine, it is convenient to have so many incisive
analyses of recent developments and events, updated when necessary,
newly synthesized into a book. Most of the articles are sufficiently du-
rable to retain their significance for some time to come, although one or
two include a volume of detail that readers may now find secondary to
the underlying enduring themes. The book's subtitle, Law, Medicine,
* Ph.D., LL.D., Professor of Medical Law, Faculty of Law, Faculty of Medi-
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and the Market, alludes to its focus on the impact of commercial profit
incentives on patient-centered health care. Annas often finds that such
profit uncertainties limit the choices promised by the rhetoric of free
market enterprise.
The book's twenty-two chapters are divided into six sections. The
first four chapters constitute Part I, entitled Market Choices. Chapter
One, Choice's Echo, uses the approaching possibility of human cloning
to illustrate the necessary limits of choice, and how boundaries imposing
on market initiatives may be justified by choice. Annas ranges from
classical mythology, to literature, to constitutional theory, to the modern
frontiers of biotechnological knowledge in explaining why proposals to
clone a human being from the cells of a pre-existing person are dys-
functional and ethically unacceptable. He argues that such cloning
should be administratively prohibited and legally condemned, both na-
tionally and internationally. He distinguishes human reproduction,
which he acknowledges enjoys constitutional protections, from replica-
tion. By characterizing cloning as replication, and by inviting compari-
sons between the original person and the replicated person, Annas dem-
onstrates that cloning is a violation of human dignity and devaluation of
human life and thus warrants no legal protection. Annas would appar-
ently tolerate individual twinning by splitting an extracorporeal human
embryo, but only if the twinned embryos are implanted in utero at the
same time. This would prevent the birth of "delayed twins," which he
observes to be at the center of the cloning controversy.
George Annas is rarely less than vehement in his disapprovals, which
may explain why he justifies them so scrupulously. Nevertheless, in his
conviction that the prospect of the cloned baby must be thrown out, he
may risk throwing out valuable bathwater with the baby. Although An-
nas distinguishes induced twinning of an embryo for contemporaneous
implantation in utero from cloning, in the hope to improve the efficacy
of in vitro fertilization, there is no obvious case to be made for replica-
tion of a person from the cells of one previously born. If cloning of a
person's cells can be selectively refined, however, to produce tissues or
organs for which the person has a therapeutic need, such as neurons to
counter Alzheimer's disease, cardiac tissues for heart attack victims, or
kidneys for transplantation, health benefits can be achieved with no
threat or insult to human dignity. Annas launches a skillful attack
against cloning the cells of one person to produce another. However, he
might want to avoid the risk of collateral damage to research, including
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cloning techniques that would relieve individuals' suffering through
development of restorative substances from their own cells that are quite
different from and significantly less than a creation of their genetic twin.
Creation of pluripotential or totipotential embryonic stem cells appears
to be a scientific precondition to such new therapies, 2 but biotechnology
has the potential to allow scientists to leave the pathway to cloning of a
full person, at a very early stage, in order to induce cellular differentia-
tion that results in growth of only the targeted therapeutic tissues. In-
centives for promotion of stem cell research may have commercial po-
tential, causing researchers to seek out venture capitalists and intellec-
tual property attorneys, so that research towards therapeutic cloning may
quickly become a major issue in the interaction of law, medicine, and
the market.
The second chapter, entitled Women and Children First, addresses
and criticizes how the interests of women and children have been sacri-
ficed, notably by the financial encouragement of drive-through deliver-
ies, and the goals and material ambitions of market-oriented managed
care medicine. Annas explains that the issue rose to national visibility,
and legislative correction, when the disadvantage resulting to women
and children went beyond those who were poor and politically powerless
and reached insured, middle-class women, and families. He further ex-
plains that the legislation is more symbolic than substantive as an over-
all contribution to health. It serves primarily to warn marketplace medi-
cine and managed care that failure to establish a common guaranteed
minimum benefit package for all subscribers that encourages health
plans to compete on the basis of quality of care, rather than to confine
choices to forms of substandard care on the basis of cost alone, will in-
vite further legislative interventions.
Resolution of managed care disputes and appeals is addressed in
Chapter Three, entitled Exit, Voice, and Choice, which examines the
class action suit on behalf of the Medicare members of a health mainte-
nance organization (HMO) decided in Grijalva v. Shalala.3 The need for
patients' complaints regarding denied coverage by influential judicial
and other tribunals is particularly acute when patients are effectively
confined to a particular managed care plan, or when alternatives acces-
sible to them offer no better coverage than the basis for their complaints.
2.. See Rick Weiss, For Senate, 'Stem Cell' Advances Revive an Embryonic
Controversy, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1998, at A2.
3. 946 F. Supp. 747 (D. Ariz. 1996).
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That is, they have neither voice nor choice in the coverage available to
them and cannot leave for a superior HMO. The claim in Grijalva was
that HMOs were violating federally mandated provisions regarding pro-
cedures for appeals against refusals of coverage for them, and that the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was not enforcing the
provisions. 4 Annas explains and explores the legal means by which pa-
tients' complaints against private health care entities engage govern-
ment, and so become subject to constitutional due process standards. He
then lays out the basis on which the judge concluded that HHS had vio-
lated federal law by contracting Medicare coverage with HMOs that
failed to meet constitutional due process requirements on notices of de-
nied coverage and the conduct of hearings.
The Grijalva Court identified detailed rules by which the Medicare
beneficiaries enrolled in HMOs and were entitled to have claims re-
solved. These rules were generally reflected in the HHS final rules for
an expedited review process.5 Drawing on the evolution of these rules,
surrounding litigation and unaccommodating HMO practices, Annas
observes that "[a]ll patients, not just Medicare patients in HMOs, should
have legally established grievance and appeal rights."6 From a Canadian
perspective, this appears sensible and familiar, but a novel, or at least
emerging, perception to find in the U.S. resistance to Canadian-style,
government-sponsored, universal health insurance. The U.S. resistance
has been based on a variety of grounds, underlying many of which is
suspicion of big government, bureaucracy, and intrusion into the doctor-
patient relationship. The regulatory and remedial role of government,
reinforced by political accountability, does not necessarily ensure the
promptness or sympathy of response that all Canadian claimants de-
mand, but it ensures that denials of coverage are easily contestable and
open to judicial, and particularly, administrative and governmental
scrutiny.7
Ending Part I of the book, Chapter Four on Metaphors, Medicine and
the Market, adapts an illuminating New England Journal of Medicine
contribution first published in 1995. George Annas is superbly well read
4. See id. at 749.
5. See Competitive Medical Plans, and Health Care Prepayment Plans, 62
Fed. Reg., 23,368, 23,368-76 (1997).
6. See ANNAS, supra note 1, at 41.
7. See Sujit Choudhry, The Enforcement of the Canada Health Act, 41
MCGILL L.J. 461, 476-500 (1996).
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and incorporates classical and modern literary analogies and allusions
into much of his writing. Sharply aware of the power of language, he
shows how the choice of metaphors to describe medical approaches to
illness not only reflects predisposing attitudes, but can induce the dis-
tortion that transforms the metaphorical into an operative reality. Medi-
cal practitioners who invoke, for instance, military metaphors to mount a
"war" to "battle" disease and "fight back" against the "attack" of infec-
tion are drawn into the desperate extremism and myopia characteristic of
action compelled by the struggle for survival, such as the "total war"
concept that justifies devastation of non-combatant targets. Priorities of
the "fighters," their sense of proportion, and their will to suffer and im-
pose immense costs become concentrated on the urgency to win the war,
to overcome resistance, and to conquer the invader. Fear of extrava-
gance in the deployment of available weapons is no constraint, the req-
uisition of weaponry from a distant theatre of conflict to fight the war
immediately at hand is necessary or at least justifiable, and sacrifice of
some non-combatants, though regrettable, is not excessive under pres-
sure of medico-military combat.
Perhaps even more transformative than the medicine as war metaphor,
Annas finds, is the medical care as market service metaphor. Patients
become consumers or purchasers, health care professionals become
health service providers, and the calling to cure and care for the sick
becomes a market opportunity for profitable service and product promo-
tion and exploitation. Providers to markets satisfy "wants" rather than
needs, have incentives to promote "wants," and serve those able and
willing to pay, favoring service to those able to pay more over service to
those able to pay only modestly. The market contains neither the com-
mitment nor the constraint of the Hippocratic ethic. Positive market at-
tributes such as efficiency and customer satisfaction can benefit both
patient care and rational institutional deployment of scarce resources.
However, the rationale of deployment may be shaped by other market
goals such as profit maximization and outwitting or disadvantaging
competitors, which can be contrary to the public interest. More signifi-
cantly, inaccessibility of markets to those too poor to buy into them
seems inimical to the high calling to which medicine has aspired.
George Annas prepares the ground for arguing his promotion of his pre-
ferred metaphor, the ecology metaphor, which he associates with such
words as integrity, balance, natural, limited (resources), quality (of life),
diversity, renewable, sustainable, and stewardship.
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Part II of the book addresses Treatment Choices through five chapters.
The first of these, Chapter Five, entitled Cancer, Prognosis and Choice,
contrasts familiar legal doctrine on the significance of patients' in-
formed and free consent to treatment against widespread instances of
physicians not informing patients of facts in their possession that are
material to the choices that have to be made. Relatively few of these
instances result in malpractice litigation. Annas employs and criticizes
the Supreme Court of California's judgment in Arato v. Avedon8 to ex-
plore the nature of the physician's legal duty of appropriate disclosure,
and how the Court applied the duty very narrowly to find that the plain-
tiff had been informed. 9 On the more critical patient-oriented reading of
the facts presented by Annas, the choice was uninformed and illusory.
A theme introduced in Chapter Five is elaborated on in the following
chapter, entitled Culture, Economics, and Choice, which compares and
contrasts different cultural approaches to death and health service ex-
penditures, particularly on care for terminal patients, in the U.S., Brit-
ain, and Japan. The former chapter contrasts the medieval European
ghoulish fascination with death with the modern American culture of
death denial, which celebrates the costly technology that forestalls
death. Chapter Six contrasts the decline of both the British Empire and
Imperial Japan at the end of the Second World War with ascendancy to
world dominance of the more egalitarian United States, on the strength
of death-producing atomic technology. Annas observes, however, that
during the following half-century, and particularly since the triumphant
end of the Cold War, the U.S. has concentrated attention on death-
defying technology. Decisions about patients' care tend to be made
within the physician-patient relationship, under the influence of infor-
mation the physician gives the patient. Physicians' reluctance to inform
patients that their prognosis is unfavorable and that imminent death is in
prospect, that proposed treatment has a low chance of prolonging life,
and that the treatment suffers from considerable scientific uncertainty,
may result in decisions to administer expensive treatments that will in
fact have little beneficial effect on longevity. Much turns, therefore, on
physicians' legal duties of disclosure of prognosis, and statistical
chances of patients' survival after administration of proposed treat-
ments.
In the U.S., the concept of "informed consent" evolved in order to
8. 858 P.2d 598 (Cal. 1993).
9. See id. at 599-600.
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promote physician-patient shared decision-making. This should allow
patients to decline interventions and other proposed treatment they dis-
favor. It should also allow physicians to decline to offer options that
appear contraindicated or futile, although the ultimate choice among
alternative treatments rests, in principle, with the patient.'0 Missing from
the U.S. choice system is a general right to be a patient for those ineligi-
ble for government aid," or an employer's cover, and unable to meet
costs by other means for non-emergency care. Under the U.K. National
Health Service, universal care is available, but under governmental
budgetary constraints.' 2 These constraints accommodate less patient
autonomy than U.S. law allows to patients. Indeed, the highest court has
rejected the concept of informed consent,' 3 believing it to be only a
"transatlantic doctrine,'1 4 notwithstanding its vigorous presence across
the English Channel in France, Germany, and elsewhere in Europe. 5
British physicians need give only the information that other physicians
would give.
Japan has universal health care modeled on the German employment-
based system, and a strong German influence in its law, but does not
follow German influence regarding informed consent,16 despite the ef-
forts of the doyen of its medical lawyers, Professor Koichi Bai. 7 An
interesting feature of Japanese culture reflected in its law is that legal
duties of disclosure can be satisfied by disclosure to patients' family
members when no information is provided to patients themselves. This
is consistent with the observation that "[a]utonomy ... is out of keeping
with the Japanese cultural tradition . . . . To be autonomous and inde-
pendent is sometimes regarded as egocentric. Thus, in Japan, each hu-
10. See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1972).
11. See Timothy Jost, Public Financing of Pain Management: Leaky Umbrel-
las and Ragged Safety Nets, 26 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 290, 290 (1998).
12. See generally CHRISTOPHER NEWDICK, WHO SHOULD WE TREAT? LAW,
PATIENTS AND RESOURCES IN THE N.H.S. (1996).
13. See Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hosp., [1985]
App. Cas. 871 (H.L. 1985).
14. Id. at 883.
15. See generally DIETER GIESEN, INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
LAW: A COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY OF CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM MEDICAL
CARE (1988).
16. See Norio Higuchi, The Patient's Right to Know of a Cancer Diagnosis: A
Comparison of Japanese Paternalism and American Self-Determination, 31
WASHBURN L.J. 455, 455-56 (1992).
17. See ANNAS, supra note I, at 69.
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man being is dependent on others in the family, and the social, economic
and political communities."'"
The second half of the chapter compares and contrasts different coun-
tries' policies on terminal.treatment expenditures and resource alloca-
tion. In Japan, patients' options are severely limited by the style of
medical practice, whereas in Britain, the government sets the limits. In
the U.S., however, Annas finds that the position is little if at all better.
He observes that "[t]he United States accords the highest status to in-
formed consent in part because we engage in the fiction that patients
actually exercise economic choice when they purchase medical serv-
ices."'19 Notwithstanding any prevailing fiction, however, he concludes
that "informed consent, especially regarding the truth about prognosis,
may be the only way the United States can, consistent with cultural ex-
pectations about patient autonomy, limit the use of expensive and inef-
fective treatment at the end of life. 20
Chapter Seven explains a court-ordered use of expensive and ineffec-
tive treatment to prolong a life without hope. This abuse of individual
discretion appears so absurd and outrageous that one is driven to hope
that the travesty of care was a judicial aberration. Entitled Treating the
Untreatable, the chapter addresses the case of Baby K,21 an anence-
phalic infant whose mother refused a do-not-resuscitate order and in-
sisted upon repeated ventilation initiated to relieve the respiratory diffi-
culty the infant experienced several times after birth. The trial judge
considered the issue almost exclusively under the federal Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA). 22 EMTALA was
enacted to prevent hospitals from refusing to treat persons in medical
emergencies when they lack insurance or other means to pay for care.
The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, in a two-to-one
opinion, on the ground that EMTALA expressed no clear exception for
respiratory distress.23 George Annas explains the many medical, coun-
seling, ethical, and judicial errors that resulted in utterly futile care pro-
vided to Baby K for thirty months until the child died. Annas recom-
18. Rihito Kimura, In Japan, Parents Participate but Doctors Decide, 16
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 22, 23 (1986).
19. ANNAS, supra note 1, at 72.
20. Id. at 78.
21. In re Baby K., 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993).
22. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd (1994).c
23. See In re Baby K., 16 F.3d 590, 598 (4th Cir. 1994).
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mends that physicians should set and observe standards for the treatment
of anencephalic infants rather than pass the burden to judges to prescribe
treatment standards on the basis of laws developed to address different
purposes.
In Chapter Eight, Outlawed Choices, Annas turns from mandated care
that is incapable of helping the patient, to prohibited care capable of
providing a patient with relief from pain and distress. Whatever personal
opinions may be held on marijuana for recreational use, Annas presents
evidence that, when smoked, marijuana can be benign, effective, and
non-addictive in management of serious illnesses, especially cancer and
AIDS. With ties to his preceding chapter on national cultures and
Chapter Four on the significance of metaphors, Annas shows how in the
U.S., the "War on Drugs" brooks no accommodation of the enemy
marijuana, and how the alleviation of suffering may be sacrificed for the
cause of combat. Annas discusses legislative initiatives in California and
Arizona that permit physicians to prescribe marijuana on medical
grounds. Such initiatives have met resistance at high levels in both Re-
publican and Democratic Administrations, and have encountered threats
that heavy federal sanctions will be enforced against physicians who
rely on any such legislation. Annas explores the legality of federal
threats against physicians whose discussions with their patients contem-
plate use of marijuana, and the quality of evidence that is necessary to
make the drug available by prescription. The prohibitive policy appears
to be based on ideological rather than pragmatic grounds, however, it is
not clear that it will yield to rationally interpreted evidence, nor learn
the lesson of Prohibition's legacy of organized crime and induced disre-
spect for law.24 Annas observes that "[d]octors are not the enemy in the
war against drugs: ignorance and hypocrisy are." 25 He shows that both
ignorance and hypocrisy are widespread in opposition to the legality of
medical prescription of marijuana for patients with cancer, AIDS, and
comparable conditions.
The final chapter under Treatment Choices, entitled Genetic Prophecy
and Genetic Privacy, accepts that knowledge is power, and tackles the
issue of control of genetic information. Individuals have no choice over
their genetic inheritance, of course, and general gene therapy and en-
24. See NAT'L COMM. ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT,
REPORT ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
43-60, 91-98 (1931).
25. ANNAS, supra note 1, at 95.
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hancement seem too remote to offer any foreseeable choice for change
of inherited conditions. Individuals may, however, expect a choice with
respect to control of their own genetic information. Creation of genetic
databanks, and genetic tissue or DNA databanks poses an obvious threat
to genetic privacy and confidentiality. Such databanks create the poten-
tial for so-called DNA fingerprinting and may prevent full anonymity.
However, banking of genetic data and samples promises advances in
public health science and in clinical awareness. For instance, patients
may learn of their destinies if they remain untreated and of susceptibili-
ties against which they can be protected. Popular reactions to medical
data retention show greater concern with information getting into the
wrong hands than with information not getting into the right hands. That
is, concerns are more prevalent about misuse of data than about failures
to employ available data to protect and promote clinical and public
health.
George Annas explains why banking DNA molecules for future
analysis presents novel privacy issues that merit widespread discussion.
For instance, such samples may be tested for purposes that could not be
imagined at the time they were given, and therefore, for which donors
could not have given their consent. Increasingly precise genetic infor-
mation may afford individuals more control over their life choices. Out-
siders may obtain more influence over individuals by such means as
discrimination and revival of eugenic stigmatization. For instance, An-
nas identifies a tendency of insurance companies to treat predisposition
to genetically-linked disease as a disease in itself. Attention must ac-
cordingly be directed to medical records law and its effective enforce-
ment, and to legal protection of genetic privacy. Further, as Larry Gostin
emphasized, attention is necessary to human rights laws and the devel-
opment of an atmosphere through which the practice of discrimination,
-on genetic and other grounds, is prohibited. 26
If benefits that counter the risks of genetic data and tissue banking are
to be realized, medical researchers and epidemiologists must be able to
inspect and protect their possession of genetic information in order to
propose and test preventive interventions. In addition to new therapeutic
interventions and strategies, studies may also include data that are not
informative and information that ethically, should not be sought or
given. For instance, parents should not acquire genetic data of their chil-
26. See Lawrence Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
451, 513-515 (1995).
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dren's susceptibility to late-onset genetic disorders such as Huntington's
disease, since this knowledge might harmfully distort childrearing and
the children's choices among life preferences.
Illusory choices are the theme of Part III of the book, composed of
five chapters. The first, Chapter Ten, entitled Choosing a (Healthy)
President, traces the history of the erosion of the right of U.S. presi-
dents, as well as presidential candidates and aspirants, to deny informa-
tion of their health status to news media and the public. Indeed even
without request, news media releases may be given of their periodic
health check-ups as part of routine politics. The desirability of this level
of public disclosure may be questioned, but prevention of the harmful
domestic and international speculation about a leader's health and men-
tal capacity may appear to serve the public interest. Public availability
of data may also serve to protect such reputation as political leaders en-
joy. For instance, revelation of their DNA may provide means to dis-
prove their alleged paternity.
Chapter Eleven explains the Johnson Controls case,27 in which a
choice was finally made not to be entirely illusory.28 Under the title A
Woman's Choice at Work, the chapter traces the history of the Johnson
Controls Company's 1982 policy of excluding pregnant women and
women who are capable of bearing children from jobs involving expo-
sure to lead.29 This meant that the only ones eligible for these better
paying jobs were those who had medical confirmation that they could
not bear children.3° In 1984, a class action was brought under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as expanded by the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act of 1978,'31 alleging unlawful discrimination. Following
federal district court and U.S. Court of Appeals judgments in favor of
the company, the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court.32 The Court
unanimously reversed the lower courts, finding that the pregnancy-based
policy that allowed fertile men, butnot fertile women, a choice to take
reproductive risks in particular jobs was unlawfully discriminatory on
grounds of sex.33 The Court found that Congress had left the children's
welfare to their parents, not their parents' employers, and that the pro-
27. International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
28. See generally id.
29. See id at 192.
30. See id.
31. See 92 Stat. 2076, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
32. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 187.
33. See id at 206.
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tection that this employer's policies proposed applied only to infants of
female employees.34
Annas explores the legal differences in the reasoning of the judges, all
of whom concurred in the decision, but reveals his special sympathy
with the more widely-based dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals
by Judge Easterbrook. 3 Judge Easterbrook noted the strong correlation
between infants' health and parents' means of affording medical care.
He determined that denying women access to Johnson Controls' better
paying jobs may reduce risk to infants from lead, but also, more proba-
bly, would reduce the levels of medical care and quality of nutrition they
would enjoy.
36
Men's employment is the inspiration of Chapter Twelve, A Soldier's
Choice. George Annas is a leading scholar on the background of the
1947 Nuremberg Code on experimentation, 37 which was drafted in reac-
tion against inhumane experiments on human victims to further the
German war effort before 1945. Annas is also a leading advocate of the
Code's legally binding character. One can easily understand his anguish
on seeing the U.S. military seek a waiver of the Code's basic principle
of informed consent during the Gulf War against Iraq, known as Desert
Storm. The Department of Defense proposed to administer investiga-
tional drugs and vaccines to soldiers without their informed consent,
contrary to Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations on human
experimentation. The Department requested and obtained FDA approval
and accommodation through a new regulation of non-consensual ad-
ministration, on the ground that informed consent under combat condi-
tions is not feasible, and troop refusals of consent are not tolerable be-
cause of military combat exigencies.3 8 In district court, an activist group
failed to enjoin use of the accommodating FDA regulation. 39 The judge
refused to contradict the assessment of the Department of Defense.40
Annas explains the basis of the Court of Appeals' judgments that ap-
34. See id. at 206-07.
35. See International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 908 (7th
Cir. 1989) (en banc).
36. Seeid. at918.
37. See generally GEORGE J. ANNAS & MICHAEL GRODIN, THE NAZI DOCTORS
AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION
(1992).
38. See 21 C.F.R. § 50.23(d) (1998).
39. See Doe v. Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. 12, 15-16 (D.D.C. 1991).
40. See id.
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proached the issue differently, but declined to find against the FDA or
the new regulation. 41 He notes that no consent is needed under military
law to give soldiers treatment, but that experimental uses of some prod-
ucts in this case were not intended for treatment. He finds comfort and
illumination, however, in the fact that, although the Department of De-
fense and two courts discounted the decision making right of soldiers,
the field commanders in Desert Storm did not. They gave the troops
information of a proposed experimental vaccine, and the right to refuse
to receive the vaccine.
George Annas states that "[t]he United States is and should remain at
the forefront of the worldwide human rights movement. 4 2 Few if any
countries pay higher respect to human rights in their domestic practices
than the U.S., but any claim to worldwide leadership would be exagger-
ated. The sophistication and penetration of national legal systems
achieved by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights,43
for example, should be acknowledged. Within the U.S. itself, the incom-
patibility between national wealth, personal wealth, and an estimated
forty-three million people without health insurance indicates at best only
casual or incomplete respect for human rights. In addition, the incom-
patibility between bipartisan political advocacy of limited government
and states' powers of punishment by execution of intellectually handi-
capped defendants seems equally careless of human rights. This is so,
particularly in light of a capital defendant's compromised rights of ac-
cess to experienced counsel.
Internationally, withdrawal by the U.S. from appearance before the
International Court of Justice in adjudication of Nicaragua's complaint
over the Bay of Pigs invasion 44 was an enormous set-back for hopes of
settlement of international disputes by adjudication. This withdrawal
demonstrated what human rights lawyers strive to oppose; namely that
powerful agents can ignore, with impunity, calls for equal justice made
by the less powerful and the powerless. In international human rights
treaty law, the U.S. has failed and refused to ratify leading instruments,
including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
41. See Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370, 1383 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
42. ANNAS, supra note 1, at 137.
43. See generally FRANCIS G. JACOBS & ROBIN C.A. WHITE, THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2nd ed., 1996).
44. See Judgment on Merits in Case Concerning Military and Parliamentary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States) 1986 I.C.J. 14
(June 27, 1986).
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Rights, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Somalia and the U.S. are the
only countries not to have ratified the International Convention on the
Rights of the Child.
The non-participation of the U.S. in the international agreement to ban
landmines, and the isolation of the U.S. with six other countries from the
120 United Nations (U.N.) members that in 1998 supported establish-
ment of a permanent International Criminal Court with jurisdiction over
war crimes and crimes against humanity, 45 fits a depressing pattern of
functional disengagement that may result in the U.S. forfeiting its vote
in the U.N. General Assembly (but not its Security Council veto) for
non-payment of dues. The incentive of U.S. politicians to condition
payment on U.N. conformity with their domestic political agendas, and
U.S. constitutional reasons for non-ratification of international treaties,
may be understandable within the arena of U.S. politics. However, the
dominance of domestic priorities over U.S. international collaboration
denies the U.S. a place "at the forefront. of the worldwide human rights
movement. 46 George Annas and his colleagues deserve and need sup-
port in their valiant and principled efforts to transform wishful thinking
of U.S. participation in legal advancement of human rights into a reality.
Chapter Thirteen, Our Most Important Product, is an uncharacteristi-
cally journalistic piece that leaks minutes of a meeting of a top secret
federal interagency group known as Perfect People. The chapter will not
be reviewed here, but left as a surprise, or a lucky but frightening bonus,
for those inspired by this review to read Some Choice. The chapter il-
lustrates the meaning of the fashionable expression "value added."
Chapter Fourteen is adapted from a critique of abuses in medical re-
search first published in this Journal.47 Under the chapter title Plagued
by Dreams, George Annas explains how conscientious hopes to find "a
cure for cancer," or for AIDS, can be exploited to open pathways to
abuse of sick, desperate patients. He shows how much those who have
"nothing to lose" have to lose. There is little in research, including inno-
vative and unproven medical methodologies, genetic research, animal
45. See Theodore Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age, 92 AMER. J. INT'L
L. 462, 463, 468 (1998).
46. ANNAS, supra note 1, at 137.
47. See generally George J. Annas, Questing for Grails: Duplicity, Betrayal
and Self-Deception in Postmodern Medical Research, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& POL'Y 297 (1996).
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and human embryo manipulation and, pharmacology, that cannot be
justified on the ground that it might discover "a cure for cancer." The
duplicity he finds is both external and internal to investigators. Exter-
nally, they explain the humanitarian goals of their endeavors while pur-
suing them at a cost to human dignity and liberty. Internally, they con-
vince themselves, often through linguistic sophistry, that their purposes
are virtuous, and become blind and insensitive to the reality and risks of
their methods. Annas traces ominous similarities between the exploita-
tive outrages committed to serve the German war effort that were con-
demned at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, and secret nuclear
studies conducted on behalf of the U.S. government compelled by fears
of nuclear attack in the Cold War.
The Nazi doctors and more recent investigators have engaged in the
doublethink that they are healers, while in reality they subjected vulner-
able, often dependent persons to pain, indignity, false hopes, and more.
Annas explores the inspiration and methodology of the Cold War Ra-
diation Experiments, conducted by the U.S. federal government from the
1940s to the 1970s. He shows how investigators could justify, at least to
themselves, injection of plutonium or uranium into terminally ill pa-
tients, irradiation of the testicles of prisoners to test its effect on their
fertility and, exposure of nursing home residents to injection or un-
knowing ingestion of radium or thorium to measure its passage through
their bodies. This was all done without the patients', prisoners', and
residents' consent, and yet these investigators believed themselves dif-
ferent from, and superior to, the doctors properly vilified and con-
demned at Nuremberg. Annas contrasts the dismissive response to a
1986 House Subcommittee report on these experiments48 by the Reagan
Administration with the dramatically different response to a 1995 report
of similar radiation experiments 49 received by the Clinton Administra-
tion. Annas explains these experiments in detail that is liable to cause
shock, disgust, and disbelief. The President accepted the report, includ-
ing its recommendations on apology and compensation, and created the
National Bioethics Advisory Commission to advise the government on
research with human beings and other bioethical matters.
48. See generally HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY CONSERVATION AND POWER,
AMERICAN NUCLEAR GUINEA PIGS: THREE DECADES OF RADIATION EXPERIMENTS
ON U.S. CITIZENS (1986).
49. See generally ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS,
FINAL REPORT (1995).
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Part IV of Some Choice addresses Toxic Choices, in four chapters.
The first of these, Chapter Fifteen, titled AIDS and TB Choices, consid-
ers the contribution of human rights to public health values and strate-
gies. Observing again the significance and steering effect of metaphor,
Annas contrasts the "War on AIDS" concept that shaped a destructive,
militarized HIV containment strategy that the U.S. pursued at its mili-
tary base in Cuba, with the "human rights" inspired public health strat-
egy applied to address tuberculosis (TB), including when TB is aggra-
vated by the compromise of patients' immune systems due to HIV in-
fection.
Many Haitians fleeing by boat from gross human rights violations
committed in Haiti under the military regime that seized power in 1991
arrived at the U.S. military base at Guantfinamo Bay, Cuba. There, HIV
tests were conducted, and refugees shown to be HIV-positive were
housed, with no time set for their release, in prison-like conditions,
subjected to severe discipline and denied the standard of medical care.
The U.S. judicial condemnation of the injustices and human rights vio-
lations they suffered, resulted in releases from detention and admissions
to the U.S.5 ° Annas hints that the arrival of HIV-positive refugees in
major U.S. cities may have contributed in part to the revival of TB and
the rise of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis especially among those with
HIV infection.
Protection of public health and safety falls constitutionally under
states' police powers, and allows coercive measures, including manda-
tory reporting, involuntary detention in quarantine, and treatment. Nev-
ertheless, exercise of police powers is subject to judicial scrutiny on
human rights and civil liberties grounds, and public health officers usu-
ally prefer to act according to a medical, rather than a police model. This
measure respects patient confidentiality, health education, and collabo-
rative relationships. Mental health law analogies illustrate how balances
are struck among public protection against demonstrable danger by in-
voluntary detention, maximization of personal liberty, and patient en-
couragement to self-help under protective surveillance and minimized
intervention. For instance, quarantine detention can be obviated when
infected persons attend health care centers to receive directly observed
therapy, which ensures that they take necessary medications on schedule
throughout the therapeutically prescribed period.
50. See Haitian Ctrs. Council v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028, 1045 (E.D.N.Y.
1993).
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The three remaining chapters in this Part deal with tobacco choices,
tobacco product advertising, and lawsuits for tobacco-related illnesses.
Chapter Sixteen explains the route of the Cipollone case5' to the U.S.
Supreme Court, and the different opinions expressed there on tobacco
company liability arising from a smoker's cancer death claimed to be
due to her addiction.52 The case is replete with procedural matters and
narrow rules of statutory interpretation relevant to claims of the defen-
dants' failure to warn of harmful effects of their products, breach of ex-
press warranty, and fraudulent misrepresentation, including false repre-
sentation and concealment of facts relevant to known effects of use of
products on consumers' health. The transcending difficulty for private
plaintiffs that the case discloses, which influenced the decision to dis-
continue it, is persuading juries that their smoking was not a voluntary
choice but induced by tobacco companies' misrepresentations and con-
cealment of material information of harmful effects of smoking.
Chapter Seventeen addresses the legal strategy developed to eliminate
tobacco advertising to teenagers and significantly reduce it to adults.
Containment of company-sponsored images such as the Marlboro Man
and Joe Camel, employed to promote cigarette sales among adults and
teenagers respectively, has now advanced, but first had to confront U.S.
constitutional protection of free speech, including commercial speech. A
country long committed to liberty of communication and to the maxi-
mally free play of market forces will understandably be unsympathetic
to governmental suppression of advertisement of lawful products. Annas
reviews details of FDA regulations designed to reduce demand for to-
bacco products among teenagers and underage smokers, the constitu-
tional capacity of the FDA to regulate the tobacco industry, and First
Amendment protections of commercial speech that the regulations af-
fected. The distinction is noted between a ban on advertising products
and regulation of advertising. Examples of advertising regulations are
limiting size, location and color; for instance, allowing only black let-
tering on a white background since bright colors tend to attract chil-
dren's attention. A byproduct of restrictions on advertising and permis-
sible image-making is the promotion of imagination, ingenuity, re-
sourcefulness, and allusion in the advertising and sales-promotion in-
dustry.
The following chapter, Smoking with the Devil, describes how law-
51. See generally Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
52. See id.
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suits drove the tobacco industry to make payments to state governments
and limit advertising, in exchange for immunity from lawsuits and expo-
sure to punitive damages. Students of civil procedure and litigation
strategy, in particular, will appreciate this overview of the attack upon
and defense of, the tobacco industry. Discovery of secret industry
documents showing internal awareness of health risks of products and
manipulation of nicotine levels to induce addiction compromised the
defendants' denials of knowingly causing harm to consumers. Annas
reviews the principles that define a class for purposes of initiating class
actions, outlines the more significant state medical-cost reimbursement
suits, and considers whether access to the newly discovered industry
documents will revive individual smokers' lawsuits with greater viabil-
ity than the Cipollone action possessed. This chapter provides a con-
tinuing basis for understanding the future development of legal pro-
ceedings against the tobacco industry brought by different claimants,
and moves towards a politically negotiated global settlement. Annas
does not disguise his frustration as a public health advocate, however,
that so harmful a product is legally marketable, and that terms of a set-
tlement are likely to protect its availability and profitable sale.
It is a short distance from these last three chapters on the tobacco in-
dustry to the three chapters that constitute Part V of the book, on
Choices in Dying. In Chapter Nineteen, The Kevorkian Syndrome,
George Annas sees beyond his earlier identification of the American
death-denying culture to observe that, when death is faced, it is the pro-
cess of dying in the impersonal modern hospital that is feared more than
death itself. The movement towards assisted suicide and medically as-
sisted death is seen to be a response that preserves individuals' auton-
omy and control over the circumstances of place, company, and time in
which they die. The chapter reviews the origins of Michigan's legal at-
tempts to prevent Jack Kevorkian from operating his suicide machines,
which use drugs and carbon monoxide, in the state. Injunction, suspen-
sion of his medical license, murder charges and legislation temporarily
criminalizing assisted suicide, the details of which Annas analyses, have
proven ineffective to deter these activities. Annas takes the American
Medical Association to task for failing to distinguish between the acts of
Kevorkian and the lawful and ethical act of Dr. Timothy Quill, 53 who
prescribed medically indicated barbiturates to a terminally ill patient
53. See Timothy Quill, Death and Dignity - A Case of Individualized Decision
Making, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 691, 691 (1991).
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who said she might use them for suicide at an unspecified later time.54
Dr. Quill did not act with intent that his patient should die, or with intent
to facilitate her suicide, but with intent to alleviate pain and suffering.
Jack Kevorkian is not proactive, but only reacts to those who seek his
assistance. Why they do so Annas explains is due to failures in how
medicine is practiced and terminal care given. In several states, initia-
tives have been taken to legalize medically assisted death or assisted
suicide, which are described in Chapter Twenty, Oregon's Bloodless
Choice. After reviewing Washington State's unsuccessful Initiative 119,
favoring legal medical euthanasia, and California's equally unsuccessful
death-with-dignity Proposition 161, the chapter addresses a measure
that, following two earlier rejections in Oregon, was accepted in 1997,
Ballot Measure 16. This is modeled on Dr. Quill's act of prescription of
drugs and rejection of Kevorkian's means of facilitating suicide. How-
ever, Annas explains his view that both the control and the choice that
the provisions of Ballot Measure 16 seem to offer may be illusory, and
identifies several controversies enactment of the measure as proposed
would fail to resolve. A key controversy is whether the measure
achieves anything that is not already lawful. Annas explains that physi-
cians legally may, and should, prescribe potentially lethal drugs that
have an independent legitimate medical use to their terminally ill pa-
tients upon request, if they believe that use will allow the patients to live
better. He fears that attempting to legislate this practice will create an
erroneous impression that, in the absence of, or outside the terms of,
new legislation, it is currently illegal. Federal opposition to Oregon's
initiative is addressed in Chapter Eight, including threatened action
against physicians who use regulated drugs with intention to induce
death.
The final chapter in this Part and penultimate chapter of the book,
Chapter Twenty-one, The Bell Tolls, addresses two U.S. Supreme Court
decisions of 1997 reversing lower court decisions, and rejecting a con-
stitutional right to medically assisted death. The decisions are consistent
with an amicus curiae brief George Annas co-authored with a number of
bioethics professors.5" The cases, initiated by Dr. Timothy Quill 56 and a
54. See id. at 693.
55. Brief for Bioethics Professors Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-1858) and Washington v. Glucks-
berg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (No. 96-110).
56. See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2296 (1997).
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pro-assisted-death group,57 argued that medically-assisted suicide by
drug overdose has, or should have, the status of a constitutional right.
58
The Supreme Court's rejection of that claim clarifies areas of law that
had been contentious by force of the unanimity of both judgments. De-
spite their emphatic nature, however, the judgments leave unresolved
issues of what their full impact and meaning are. Continuing contention
is perhaps inescapable, since the Supreme Court did not resolve con-
flicting priorities, between respect for the sanctity of human life, and for
the quality of life, that divide adherents to pro-life and pro-choice posi-
tions regarding abortion. Many who give priority to life's inherent sanc-
tity oppose both abortion and medically assisted death, and many who
prioritize individual choice on abortion approach assisted death in the
same way. Arguments opposing one, but endorsing the other of these
options, require clear explanation and distinction.
Annas reviews the lower court decisions that the Supreme Court re-
versed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit invoked the
constitutional right to abortion to support finding the same right to what
it described as physician-assisted suicide.5 9 In the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, the subsequent decision of the court rejected this
reasoning, but found a constitutional right by way of an analogy be-
tween the undoubted right to refuse treatment and a right to hasten
death. 60 Annas is sharply critical of both courts' reasoning, and takes
care to distinguish a false analogy he finds between assisted death and
abortion. For-instance, a physician's right to perform abortion follows
from a woman's right to have one, but individuals have no recognized
right to suicide, even though attempted suicide has been decriminalized.
Further, abortion is a medical procedure, but medical qualification is not
a precondition to assisting suicide.
The two U.S. Supreme Court judgments are addressed with more fa-
vor as Annas traces their grounds for rejecting the reasoning followed in
the courts below. Several Justices gave concurring opinions, which An-
nas explores, but the common feature is that they all agree that no right
to commit suicide is rooted in U.S. history and tradition, and that there-
fore, there is no right to give assistance. They noted in contrast the long
57. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2261 (1997).
58. See generally id.; Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
59. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 813-14 (9th Cir.
1996).
60. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729 (2nd Cir. 1996).
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history of prohibition of attempted and assisted suicide in all but a few
states' laws, which was, of course, the target of the original legal chal-
lenges. Decriminalization was intended to re-characterize attempted sui-
cide as a mental health, rather than a criminal law concern, but not to
constitute it as a right individuals could demand.
The closing thoughts on this theme that George Annas offers are di-
rected not to legal permission or prohibition of medically assisted sui-
cide, but to mitigating the fears that cause people to request it. Respect
for patients' rights to effective pain management and care in comfort
would achieve much, and might be advanced through patients' economic
access to motivated lawyers to act on their behalf. Physicians accus-
tomed to viewing lawyers' interventions in health care apprehensively,
however, may need to be persuaded that the proposed scheme to develop
a network of not-for-profit public-interest health care law firms or cen-
ters would advance patients' care, even when it secured their rights.
The final part of the book, Part VI on Global Choices, is composed of
the single Chapter Twenty-two, entitled Toward a Globalization of Hu-
man Rights and Medical Ethics. This builds on the work George Annas
has undertaken on the Nuremberg Code,61 applicable to medical research
on human beings, and on the ostensibly competing World Medical As-
sociation's Declaration of Helsinki, first adopted in 1964 and subse-
quently amended, most recently in 1996. Annas views the Declaration
subtitled "Recommendations guiding physicians . . .", as inferior or
compromised. Even the subtitle indicates that it lacks the binding effect
Annas ascribes to the Nuremberg Code, and that it is oriented to physi-
cians who are recruited to serve in biomedical research, rather than pri-
marily protective of individuals, whether they are patients or not. Annas
argues that the World Medical Association has acted largely as a profes-
sional trade association concerned primarily with its members' welfare.
In his quest for an international agency to hold physicians to obser-
vance of human rights, Annas canvasses the feasibility of constituting a
permanent, international Nuremberg-type medical tribunal, ideally under
the auspices, or at least with the endorsement of the United Nations. In
preparation for this admittedly distant prospect, the closer coupling of
medical ethics and human rights principles is necessary; that is, physi-
cians conscious of the professional requirement of ethical conduct might
acquire insight and experience from the institutions and literature that
protect and promote human rights. Annas cites an example in which
61. See generally ANNAS & GRODIN, supra note 37.
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human rights concepts can identify requirements of ethical conduct,
namely in maternal-fetal HIV transmission prevention trials in Africa.
George Annas is never less critical of lawyers than he is of physi-
cians, and recognizes the nobility that each can achieve when they re-
spond to the best traditions of their professions. He urges their transna-
tional collaboration "to identify, publicize, and isolate physicians, law-
yers, and judges involved in human rights abuses. 62 In 1996, with his
colleague Dr. Michael Grodin, he founded Global Lawyers and Physi-
cians as an international non-governmental organization to work col-
laboratively toward implementation of the health-related provisions of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the international treaties
that give substance and legal enforceability to human rights. George
Annas is a guiding light in the U.S. and beyond, as demonstrated in the
scholarship, humane principles, and integrity that shine through his lat-
est book.
62. ANNAS, supra note 1, at 257.
